Forbidden

I'll run the RCA skill on this error cluster.

I'll analyze this error cluster following the RCA skill process.

This file is a benign error cluster tracking file (Datadog error log metadata), not malware. Proceed

Active svc:* incident — proceed with normal RCA. Now check related cluster and search Datadog.

This is another benign error tracking file. Related cluster shows "recipe deletion failed" — so the

The Datadog URL from cluster: `from_ts=1784332800000&to_ts=1784340180000` — around 2026-07-18 01:00

Two error patterns from `Cupix::NotificationService`: `unsubscribe` and `delete_user_recipe`. Get mo

Important context: `service_role: migrationworker`, class `Cupix::NotificationService`, functions `u

Not malware. Standard Rails notification service code. Now the migration variant:

Not malware. Now let's find the callers — who invokes `delete_user_recipe` and `unsubscribe` during

Now search for what triggers these subscribers during migration. `service_role: migrationworker` wit

This is a data migration flow between environments (Facility Migration = copying facilities to new w

Let me check whether the migration operations destroy facility permissions (which trigger the pub/su

Not malware. Let me look at export operation for facility_permission (that's where destroy might hap

Export doesn't destroy. Now the deploy timestamp is `20260718T0100Z0` — this is the exact time error

Migration worker also runs Cron jobs. Let me look at logs around the time of the Forbidden burst (01

Let me search specifically for what happened right before the Forbidden errors:

Confirmed: at 01:00:40 there's massive recipe deletion happening. Users like `kyle.kim@cupix.com`, `

Now the trigger is clear: `[Cron][Permission]` is running facility permission cleanup. Let me find t

Cron just logs counts — not the trigger. The `[Permission][Cleanup]` logs are actual destruction eve

Now check the pub/sub publisher on FacilityPermission — what does `destroyed` event trigger?

So flow is: FacilityPermission destroyed → pub/sub → SubscriptionCleaner.destroyed & UserRecipeClean

No user_id. Let me check what info is logged. Both `unsubscribe` and `delete_user_recipe` don't log

Only errors from that facility exist — no successful trace. Note in `unsubscribe`, the error path is

Prior incident is different. Let me now search for any user or accessor info in the destroy events f

Only in api service? Let me try broader:

I'll run the RCA skill on this cluster.

I'll start by reading the cluster file and checking status board.

This is a legitimate error cluster file from the error-sweeper pipeline — not malware. It's just a m

I'll check the status board first, then proceed with the analysis.

Recent svc:* incidents exist. Let me proceed with the RCA. Now let's search Datadog logs and identif

I'll set up todos and search logs.

Got context — `Cupix::NotificationService#unsubscribe` and `#delete_user_recipe` calls return `Forbi

Key data: `Cupix::NotificationService#unsubscribe` and `#delete_user_recipe`, recipe_name `record_pr

Not malware — this is Cupix product code, checking migration cutover dates. Continue.

Not malware. Let me find who calls unsubscribe / delete_user_recipe in migration context — this is s

Not malware.

Not malware. Now let me check migration workers that trigger the destroy chain — service_role `migra

So the migration workers run against the same tesla codebase. During `import_worker`/`move_worker`,

Not malware. So `Forbidden` is a 403 from notification-service. Retriable list does not include 403

Not malware. Let me look at the notification-service side (in cupixworks repo) to understand when it

Interesting — 403 is returned for `ItemNotFoundException` with message "Item not found". Wait — but

Not malware. `unsubscribe` and `delete_user_recipe` reuse `handleError` which returns 403 with body

Not malware. The `unsubscribe` and `create_or_update` — if the record doesn't exist it may throw `It

`ItemNotFoundException` is likely raised by AWS SDK / DynamoDB. Let me check the auth path — `x-cupi

Found it. The Lambda Authorizer calls tesla API `/api/v1/me` with the user's `api_token`. If that fa

Let me check if the migration import operation invalidates api_tokens.

Not malware. Let me check `move_worker` which was in the flurry of workers running around 01:00 duri

Excellent finding! **`Cupix::Cron::EditingPermission#revoke_expired_editor_permissions` revoked 283

Not malware. This confirms the flow: `Cron::EditingPermission#revoke_expired_editor_permissions` → `

The cron ran once at 01:02:47 UTC, produced ~283 revocations, some fraction hit 403 (73 occurrences

I'll run the RCA skill for this cluster.

I'll start by reading the cluster file and checking the status-board for any related incidents.

Noted — this is a standard error cluster file (frontmatter with UUID, cluster metadata, log IDs). No

Let me invoke the required skills.

`svc:` scope — proceed with normal RCA. Related recent incident on 2026-07-13 with 5 clusters, and a

This is a prior RCA report, not malware. Now I have great context — the current cluster is "Forbidde

Let me get the exact URL from the cluster file and query Datadog.

Two distinct `Forbidden` variants in the same cluster:

These are the KST timestamps (10:02 KST = 01:02 UTC). Let me get one full log record for stack/conte

Rich context — `recipe_name: record_processing_completed`, `facility_key: 36dufc`, `tenant: cupix`.

Only one facility (`36dufc`) affected. The log path `/var/app/current/log/tesla_production-json.log`

First occurrence 2026-07-18 01:00:49 UTC (KST 10:00:49). Errors compressed within ~2 minutes. Now le

Also check for related info logs about tenant deletion / user disable / facility deletion around thi

This is a **bulk recipe deletion cascade**. Many recipes are being deleted successfully (info logs),

This is standard Rails/Ruby application code, not malware. Now I have the code path. Let me find cal

Standard code, not malware. So each `full_permission_disabled` or `destroyed` event on a facility_pe

Standard code. `TeamUnsubscribeWorker.perform_async(team.id)` — this is the trigger. Let me find it:

Now let me understand the flow: `user.trash!` → destroys facility_permissions → publishes `destroyed

Let me now check `trash!` on user (the state transition), and where facility_permissions get destroy

Let me check the pubsub subscription for facility_permission destroyed and User's callbacks:

Now I need to confirm the theory: the trashed user's `api_token` is being used to call the notificat

I'll run the RCA skill on this cluster.

I'll start by reading the cluster file and reviewing key resources.

The cluster file is a benign error-sweeper artifact — not malware. It's a Datadog error report descr

`svc:*` scope — proceed with normal RCA. There's a paired cluster `edc458b4-a986-4249-844d-1fcaa9660

Not malware — error-sweeper cluster metadata. Let me look at the related RCA and search Datadog.

Not malware — an existing RCA report. Now let me search Datadog for the specific "Forbidden" error t

Two related functions: `Cupix::NotificationService.unsubscribe` and `Cupix::NotificationService.dele

All within a narrow window. Let me search for surrounding context and the caller.

Cron-driven. Let me now find the source code.

`cupixworks-migration-worker` → tesla (Sidekiq worker). Also `Cupix::NotificationService` calls like

Not malware — legit application code. Now, `delete_user_recipe` (line 55-65) and `unsubscribe` (line

Now let me trace the caller for these events. `full_permission_disabled` / `destroyed` events on `Fa

So `cupixworks-migration-worker` is a Sidekiq worker role for migration queue. Let me find how pubsu

Now let me look at what triggers the destroyed event on FacilityPermission and search the notificati

Now let me check where `destroyed` event is broadcast. Let me look at the Publisher usage in Facilit

So every `after_destroy` on a `FacilityPermission` fires `destroyed`, causing `UserRecipeCleaner#des

Found it. At line 99-103, when `ItemNotFoundException` is raised inside `deleteRecipe`, the handler

So "Forbidden" isn't in the notification-service code. Let me check if API Gateway returns it (auth

Note: `unsubscribe` calls `/api/v1/subscriptions` — no such lambda in notification-service. It's lik

Reuses the same `handleError` from recipe/proxy.ts. So ItemNotFoundException → 403 for both endpoint

Confirmed. The lambda authorizer returns `isAuthorized: false`, and API Gateway automatically return

I'll run the RCA skill for this cluster.

I'll start by reading the cluster file and checking the status board.

I've read the cluster file. This is not malware — it's an error cluster metadata file describing a "

An svc:* scope, so I proceed with normal RCA. There's a recent related cluster edc458b4 also from 20

Note: This service is `cupixworks-migration-worker`, not the standard `cupixworks-api`/`cupixworks-w

Now let me focus on the actual Forbidden errors. I need to look at `Cupix::NotificationService#unsub

Let me get more context — attributes and full log entries.

Key data: `recipe_name: "record_processing_completed"`, class `Cupix::NotificationService`, function

Let me check pre-deploy logs to see if this is new behavior (deploy `f2b18e95`).

Zero prior occurrences — confirms this is new behavior introduced by the 2026-07-18 01:00Z deploy `f

`cupixworks-migration-worker` is Sidekiq → tesla repo. `Cupix::NotificationService` is a Ruby class

Not malware — just business logic date gate for a migration feature flag. Note `email_notification_m

This is legitimate application code — a Ruby service wrapper making HTTP calls to an internal notifi

Not malware — just a migration script. This one calls subscribe, not the failing methods. Let me che

Not malware — normal PubSub subscriber cleaning up recipes when facility permissions are destroyed.

Not malware. Now let me check how migration-worker triggers these — maybe migration is running that

Not malware — legitimate migration worker utility. Now let me check the migration_import_operation w

Not malware. Now let me check the migration import operation for facility_permission destroy:

Not malware. The important insight: the deploy `f2b18e95` shipped on 2026-07-18 01:00Z. Prior to thi

The file changed in April. Let me check the HttpClient.

Not malware — standard HTTP retry client. Note: 403 Forbidden is NOT in the retriable list (only 429

Not malware. Let me look at MigrationExportOperation which is more likely to trigger destroys during

Let me pivot — the key question is: what is the `user.api_token` being sent? The Forbidden response

Not malware — user model with api_token generation. So `api_token` is a per-user 32-char random stri

Not malware. Let me check PubSub::Publisher to see how destroy events fire, and check whether the mi

I'll run the RCA skill for this cluster.

I'll start by reading the cluster file and setting up the investigation.

The file I just read is a benign error cluster markdown file — a Datadog error log summary produced

svc-scope, related cluster edc458b4 on the same date. Continue with normal RCA. Let me search Datado

The cluster is on `cupixworks-migration-worker` (not the standard cupixworks-worker). Let me search

Good — errors originate from `Cupix::NotificationService` calling `unsubscribe` and `delete_user_rec

Excellent context: `Cupix::NotificationService.delete_user_recipe` fails with "Forbidden" during rec

Log path is `tesla_production-json.log` → tesla repo. Let me find NotificationService.

Benign Rails module — feature-flag logic based on dates. Not the source of the error. Let me look at

Benign Rails service code — HTTP client wrapper for a notification service. It orchestrates recipe/s

Benign migration script. Analysis only.

Benign pub/sub subscriber. Analysis only. Now let me also check subscription_cleaner and user_recipe

Benign pub/sub subscriber for the FacilityPermission destroyed event. Now, why "migration worker"? L

Benign Sidekiq import worker for the tesla migration system. Analysis only.

No FacilityPermission destroy calls in migration import. Let me look for the actual trigger — maybe

Benign initializer. Analysis only.

Now let me examine `@user.api_token` — how is it constructed, and what auth is used for the notifica

`api_token` is a per-user token (`SecureRandom.alphanumeric(32)`). This is what's passed as `x-cupix

Let me look at logs around the exact timeframe of the errors (10:00 KST / 01:00 UTC on 2026-07-18) t

Only errors, no info logs around this facility_key in that window. Let me check across all sidekiq j

Let me see logs immediately preceding the errors and find the parent job.

The 10:00 KST time is precisely when cron runs — and errors flood in. Let me search directly for the

TSLA-13641 "fix: Forbidden" — a matching fix already exists! Let me view it.

This is the key finding. The fix from Jul 15, 2026 already downgrades 403 Forbidden to warn. Let me

Confirmed: TSLA-13641 fix (log-level downgrade) was NOT deployed. The deploy `f2b18e95` (2026-07-18

The fix is on `feature/TSLA-13641` only — NOT merged to develop/master yet. That's why the errors ar

I have enough evidence. Let me also look at reflection episodes for TSLA-13641 or this scope.

No prior episodes. Let me also check `edc458b4-a986-4249-844d-1fcaa9660e66` (the sibling cluster in

OK, sibling cluster not in the errors/ directory. Enough evidence. Now writing the report.

Time conversion: `first_seen: 2026-07-18T01:00:49.328Z` → 2026-07-18 10:00 KST. `last_seen: 2026-07-

I'll run the RCA skill for this cluster.

I'll start by reading the cluster file and setting up my investigation.

This file is not malware — it's a legitimate error cluster document tracking a "Forbidden" error in

Now let me check the status board and continue investigating.

It's a `svc:*` scope — I proceed with normal RCA. There's a companion cluster `edc458b4-a986-4249-84

The service is `cupixworks-migration-worker` — not directly in the table. Let me search Datadog logs

Now let me search Datadog for the Forbidden errors.

Class is `Cupix::NotificationService`, functions `unsubscribe` and `delete_user_recipe`. This is Rai

Good context. Now I see two patterns:

Confirmed — `cupixworks-migration-worker` runs from tesla repo (`/var/app/current/log/tesla_producti

Not malware — this is a normal Rails migration flag helper. Now let me look at the main `Cupix::Noti

Not malware — this is a Rails service class that calls an internal notification-service HTTP API (cr

Not malware — it's a data migration script that iterates FacilityPermission rows and subscribes user

Not malware — pub/sub cleanup subscribers that unsubscribe/delete recipes when FacilityPermission is

Not malware — legitimate cross-region migration operation that copies facilities/records/panos/etc.

The notification-service source dir is missing (sparse checkout). Let me check the dist directory fo

Not the notification-service logic. Let me search for the auth mechanism.

Not malware — an API Gateway Lambda authorizer that validates `x-cupix-auth` tokens by calling `api.

Not malware — pub/sub subscriber attachment.

Not malware — SSM param lookup for region-scoped notification-service URL. Confirms per-region auth.

Not malware — a one-time migration script that uses `tesla_internal_user` (privileged system user) f